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Branzburg, Who?
The Existence of a Reporter's Privilege
in Federal Courts
In 2003, President George W. Bush told the nation that Iraq
had tried to buy uranium to make a nuclear weapon. Joseph Wil-
son, who had gone to Niger for the CIA in 2002 in order to investi-
gate that claim, came forward shortly after the President's speech
to announce that he had found no such information. Robert No-
vak, Judith Miller, and Matthew Cooper, all journalists, were then
allegedly told that Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, was a CIA opera-
tive. That information was published, thereby compromising her
and rendering her unable to continue working undercover.
Federal prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald was appointed to deter-
mine who had given Ms. Plame's name to the journalists, and
whether that individual had committed a crime in doing so. He
began a grand jury investigation into the matter and called the
reporters as witnesses. Ms. Miller refused to reveal the name of
her source, claiming the protection of a reporter's privilege to do
so. The D.C. District Court found her in contempt and ordered her
to jail until she revealed her source, or the grand jury term ended,
whichever came first. The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, and the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari.
This comment asks the question, "Is there a federal common law
reporter's privilege?" The Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue since Branzburg v. Hayes1 in 1972, prior to the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Branzburg majority held that
there was no absolute reporter's privilege available under the
First Amendment to refuse to answer questions in a grand jury
proceeding. The Branzburg opinion was signed by a majority, but
federal courts since its release have spent considerable energy re-
stricting its holding. This comment looks at the federal common
law, including Branzburg, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the vari-
ous views of the circuits, and state law to conclude that yes, re-
porters have a privilege to refuse to reveal their sources, but it is a
1. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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qualified one that can be overcome in many circumstances by a
strong showing of need by the party requesting the information.
IN THE BEGINNING...
The controversy over a reporter's right to refuse to name his
sources dates to the Colonial times, when Benjamin Franklin's
older brother was reportedly jailed for refusing to reveal his
source. The first reported federal case occurred in 1848, when a
reporter was jailed for contempt of Senate for failing to disclose
the name of a source who provided him with a copy of a secret
draft of a Mexican-American War treaty.' Another reporter was
jailed in 1857 when he refused to reveal the names of House
members who told him of bribe-taking colleagues.4 From that time
until the Depression, there were various battles between the press
and both the legislature and judiciary.5 During and after the De-
pression, journalistic sources became more widely sought-after, as
stories of labor unrest and municipal corruption came out.
6
Rather than reveal their sources, however, most reporters faced
with demands for their sources chose to sit out their contempt sen-
tences in jail.7 This "ritualistic jailing" of reporters brought about
action by state legislatures, and nearly half the states had some
form of shield law by 1973.8
BRANZBURG V. HAYES
The Supreme Court decided Branzburg v. Hayes in 1972.9 The
case was actually four consolidated appeals, two from Kentucky,'0
one from Massachusetts," and one from California,12 in which re-
porters were brought before grand juries to answer questions
about, inter alia, the identity of hashish makers and the activities
2. James A. Drobile, Note, The Journalist and His Confidential Informants - Should
They Be Privileged from Compelled Disclosure, 32 Temp. L.Q. 432 (1958-1959).
3. Ex Parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (C.C.D.C. 1848).
4. 23 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Proce-





9. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
10. Branzburg v. Hayes and Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971); Branzburg v. Pound,
461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970).
11. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971).
12. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
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and purposes of the Black Panthers." Justice White, writing for
the majority, characterized the issue as "whether requiring news-
men to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries
abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First
Amendment."14 The reporters argued that the free flow of infor-
mation, protected by the First Amendment, would be harmed if
they were forced to reveal sources to whom they had promised con-
fidentiality, because those and other potential sources would be
deterred from providing information in the future if they knew
that the confidentiality they were promised was only illusory. 5
The reporters proposed a balancing test, in which the burden on
newsgathering would be weighed against the public interest in
obtaining the confidential source. 6
Justice White pointed out that the reporters were seeking an
exemption from the ordinary duty of citizens to appear before a
grand jury. 7 In support of his position, he reviewed various per-
missible incidental burdens that result from requiring reporters to
obey generally applicable laws. 8 Justice White then traced the
history of reporters' claims for a First Amendment privilege, be-
ginning with Garland v. Torre,9 in which the Second Circuit re-
jected a claim of a First Amendment privilege by a reporter in a
civil case. ° He found that courts had regularly applied a pre-
sumption against testimonial privileges and concluded that the
burdens on the First Amendment were outweighed by the general
obligation of citizens to give requested information in grand juries
and trials.2' This balance, Justice White argued, was required by
13. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667-75.
14. Id. at 667. The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679-80.
16. Id. at 680. They argued that they should not be forced to testify at either a grand
jury or a trial, unless tests were met: first, that there are sufficient grounds for believing
that the reporter has relevant information; second, that the information is unavailable from
other sources; and third, that the need for the information outweighs the First Amendment
invasion. Id.
17. Id. at 682.
18. Id. at 683-86. The press is not free from the requirements of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Sherman Act, or non-discriminatory taxa-
tion. Id. at 683. Nor, Justice White continued, may it publish anything it wants. Id. The
press may not publish knowing or reckless falsehoods, may be punished for contempt, and
has no right to information greater than that of the public. Id. at 684. In addition, the
press may be excluded from various government functions, crime scenes, and trials, in each
case, so long as the public is also excluded. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684-85.
19. 259 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1958).
20. Garland, 259 F.2d at 545.
21. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 686.
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the constitutional nature of grand jury proceedings in determining
probable cause and protecting citizens from unfounded prosecu-
tions.22
Justice White noted that only a handful of states had enacted a
reporter's privilege at the time and that "the only testimonial
privilege for unofficial witnesses" was the Fifth Amendment, and
he declined to create a new privilege based on the First Amend-
ment. He argued that the desire of informants not to be revealed
usually stemmed from a wish to either avoid prosecution or to
avoid the entanglements of testifying as a witness, neither of
which deserved First Amendment protection.2 4 He also noted that
the Court had insufficient evidence to determine what, if any, ef-
fect the denial of confidentiality might have on the willingness of
informants to come forward.25
In any event, Justice White reasoned, the claimed privilege
would belong to the reporters, not the sources, and if the authori-
ties were able to identify the source on their own, no privilege
would exist to protect that source from testifying. 6 In addition,
agreements to keep information secret were traditionally frowned
upon, and to give such agreements First Amendment protection
would denigrate that history.27
Justice White briefly addressed the reporters' argument that
the State be required to show a substantial relation between the
sought information and a compelling interest in order to overcome
the burden on First Amendment rights.2 8 He looked at the inter-
est of the government in the subjects of the cases before him and
the likelihood that the reporters could provide relevant informa-
tion, and determined that the interest in obtaining all relevant
testimony in a grand jury proceeding outweighed the burden on
the reporters' First Amendment rights.29
22. Id. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. "Infa-
mous" crimes now include those punishable by death or imprisonment of more than one
year at hard labor. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
23. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689-90.
24. Id. at 692-93.
25. Id. at 693. "We doubt if the informer who prefers anonymity but is sincerely inter-
ested in furnishing evidence of crime will . .. be deterred by the prospect of dealing with
those public authorities. .. ." Id. at 695.
26. Id. at 696.
27. Id. at 697.
28. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 700.
29. Id. at 701.
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Turning to practical considerations, Justice White noted the dif-
ficulties of administering a reporter's privilege." He pointed out
that Congress is able to determine if such a privilege is necessary
or desirable, and has the ability to define its contours.31 In addi-
tion, he noted that the Attorney General had fashioned rules for
press subpoenas." Finally, he reminded his readers of other pro-
tections available to the press: "grand jury investigations, if insti-
tuted or conducted in bad faith, would pose wholly different is-
sues."33 He concluded,
[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest
in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury
proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential,
but uncertain, burden on newsgathering that is said to
result from insisting that reporters, like ordinary citi-
zens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the
course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal
trial. 4
Justice Powell, though he signed the majority opinion, wrote a
brief concurring opinion to, as he put it, "emphasize what seems to
me to be the limited nature of the Court's holding."5 He set out a
balancing test, in which each claim of privilege would be judged on
its own facts, against the common obligation of citizens to provide
evidence.36
Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Marshall and Brennan.37 He believed that the First Amendment
interest belonged to society as a whole, not just to the reporters or
the sources,3" and that the majority was allowing authorities to
30. Id. at 702-07.
31. Id. at 706.
32. Id. Attorney General Regulations, see 28 C.F.R. § 50.10. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
706-07.
33. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
34. Id. at 690-91.
35. Id. at 709.
36. Id. at 710. "In short," he said, "the courts will be available to newsmen under cir-
cumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection." Id.
37. Id. at 725.
38. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also filed a
dissenting opinion, in which he argued for an absolute reporter's privilege. United States v.
Caldwell, 408 U.S. at 713 (Caldwell was one of the other reporters whose case was decided
in Branzburg). In his dissent, Justice Douglas wrote, "My belief is that all the 'balancing'
was done by those who wrote the Bill of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in abso-
lute terms, they repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated versions of the First
Amendment... advance[d] in this case." Caldwell, 408 U.S. at 713.
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"annex" the press as an "investigative arm of the government."3 9
He argued that, since the press has an obvious right to publish the
news, it must also have the right to gather it, and that right nec-
essarily implies the right to a confidential relationship between
the reporter and his source.40 Justice Stewart was concerned with
the Court's demand for "scientific precision" in determining
whether sources will be deterred from providing information."
Instead, Justice Stewart set forth a threshold inquiry: whether
there was a rational connection between the government's action
and the impairment of First Amendment rights, and whether that
effect would be more than de minimus.42 Then, he wrote, the
Court should determine whether there was an unconstitutional
infringement on First Amendment rights by balancing the compet-
ing interests.'
Justice Stewart noted that the deterrent effect the lack of a
privilege may have on the free flow of information, although not
scientifically proven, was sufficiently established to warrant con-
sideration." He concluded that the loss of valuable information
harms the public interest in its free flow.45 Against this, he
weighed society's interest in grand jury proceedings and noted
that there were already several limits on that institution's ability
to gather information, including common-law evidentiary privi-
leges."6
A balance of these interests, Justice Stewart said, demanded
that the government show three things before requiring a reporter
to reveal his source: (1) that the information sought is relevant to
a "precisely defined subject of government inquiry;" (2) that there
is a reasonable belief that the witness has the information; (3) and
that there is no means less destructive of the First Amendment to
obtain it.
47
39. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 728. There are three factual predicates, Justice Stewart asserts, that lead to
this proposition: first, that reporters require sources; second, that confidentiality is essen-
tial to the relationship between them; and third, that the subpoena power will either deter
sources from providing information or reporters from printing it. Id.
41. Id. at 733. "We have never before demanded that First Amendment rights rest on
elaborate empirical studies demonstrating beyond any conceivable doubt that deterrent
effects exist." Id.
42. Id. at 733-34.
43. Id. at 734-35.
44. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 735-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 736.
46. Id. at 737.
47. Id. at 740.
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THE POST-BRANZBURG PROCESS
Almost immediately after the Court's decision, federal courts
started chipping away at its rule. Many federal courts interpreted
Branzburg as establishing a qualified privilege for news reporters,
and the Supreme Court has chosen not to directly address the is-
sue in spite of numerous opportunities to do so. '8 When discussing
Branzburg in the context of similar issues, the Court seems to in-
terpret it as denying a privilege to reporters in both grand jury
and criminal setting.49 Generally, the federal circuits have limited
Branzburg to the grand jury setting, and have used Justice Pow-
ell's concurring opinion to fashion a qualified privilege in both civil
and criminal cases.0 Other courts have simply chosen to ignore
Branzburg and hold the existence of a First Amendment privilege
in civil and criminal cases based on their own precedents.51 This
section deals with the treatment the circuit courts have given the
question of a reporter's privilege since Branzburg.
A party seeking discovery of confidential information in a civil
case in the First Circuit must establish that its request is not
frivolous. 2 The circuit court has set forth a shifting burden of
proof, first requiring the party seeking the information to show
that it is relevant, then requiring the party asserting the privilege
to show the need for confidentiality.53 Thereafter, once both par-
ties have met their burdens of proof, the reviewing court must de-
48. See, e.g., LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Corp., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Still-
man, Inc., v. Globe Newspaper Corp., 633 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v.
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126; Miller v. Transameri-
can Press, 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
49. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1990). See also University of Penn-
sylvania v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1991).
50. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
"The application of the Branzburg holding to non-grand jury cases seems to require that
the claimed First Amendment privilege and the opposing need for disclosure be judicially
weighed...." Farr, 522 F.2d at 468 (ultimately finding that the journalist's privilege was
outweighed by the state trial court's power and duty to enter enforceable orders to protect
the due process rights of the accused).
51. In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1998). The court cited Branzburg in the
next paragraph for the difficulties in determining who qualifies for the privilege. Madden,
151 F.3d at 128.
52. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597 (1st Cir. 1980).
The party does this by showing that it can establish jury issues on the essential elements of
its case, outside the contested discovery. Bruno & Stillman, 633 F.2d at 597.
53. Bruno & Stillman, 633 F.2d at 597. The Second Circuit considered the issue in the
context of a defamation case, where the defendant was a media entity. Id.
323
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cide the importance of confidentiality to the reporter's effective-
ness.' In criminal cases, the First Circuit requires a balance be-
tween the press's interests in freedom from governmental intru-
sion and a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.55 The court
expressed concern about the "casual, if not cavalier" use of noncon-
fidential information in criminal proceedings, and indicated that
nonconfidential information may be entitled to protection as well.56
Recently, the First Circuit reaffirmed its version of the reporter's
privilege.57 First, like other circuits to consider the question, it
determined that a reporter is entitled to the privilege when he
intended, from the start, to disseminate his information to the
public.58 It then reiterated its burden-shifting test, after which the
need for the information is weighed against the reporter's interest
in confidentiality and the harm to the free flow of information.59
The First Circuit has discussed a reporter's privilege in the con-
text of a special proceeding, akin to a grand jury, but ultimately
found that, regardless of any privilege, the information sought
from the reporter was unquestionably relevant to a "good faith
investigation," and that reasonable efforts were made to obtain
the information from another source. °
The Second Circuit also requires a balancing test in civil6 and
criminal" cases. In that circuit, courts are to demand that the
party seeking confidential information show that the information
is "highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to the main-
tenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other sources."63
The test is the same in criminal matters, although a criminal de-
fendant's evidentiary needs may weigh more heavily.' The Sec-
ond Circuit has also upheld claims of privilege for nonconfidential
54. Id.
55. United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988).
56. LaRouche, 841 F.2d at 1182. The court ultimately concluded that the media's First
Amendment interest was outweighed by the defendant's interests in obtaining the informa-
tion. Id.
57. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998).
58. Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 714. The court applied the privilege to an academician
gathering information for a study that would be transmitted to the public. Id.
59. Id. at 716.
60. In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004)
61. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973). See also In re Petroleum Products Anti-Trust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982).
62. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983).
63. Burke, 700 F.2d at 77 (citing Baker, 470 F.2d at 783-85; Petroleum Products, 680
F.2d at 7-8; Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 713-15; Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 438).
64. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983).
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information,65 although the court applies a much more lenient test
in that situation.66 In order to determine whether the party claim-
ing the privilege is entitled to it, the Second Circuit requires that
the "the individual claiming the privilege must demonstrate, through
competent evidence, the intent to use material - sought, gathered or
received - to disseminate information to the public and that such
intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering process. " 7
Branzburg does not control in civil" or criminal69 cases in the
Third Circuit. In civil matters, that court has limited Branzburg
to holding only that journalists have no absolute privilege to re-
fuse to answer relevant questions in a grand jury setting, which
was inapplicable in the civil setting.7" Thus, the Third Circuit
said, it was required to balance the First Amendment considera-
tions against the need for evidence in the particular case.71 The
party seeking the reporter's evidence is required to show the "ma-
teriality, relevance, and necessity of the information," as well as
that there is no other source from which to obtain it.72 In criminal
cases, the Third Circuit weighs the defendant's interest in obtain-
ing the information as one factor in deciding whether the re-
porter's privilege is overcome.7" The confidentiality of the informa-
tion sought, while not irrelevant, is but one factor in the analysis.74
65. Id. at 76.
66. Gonzales v. National Broadcasting Corp., Inc., 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999)
("Where a civil litigant seeks nonconfidential information from a nonparty press entity...
[he must show] that the materials at issue are of likely relevance to a significant issue in
the case, and are not reasonably obtainable from other available sources.").
67. Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987).
68. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979). The Third Circuit explained:
The strong public policy which supports the unfettered communication to the
public of information, comment and opinion and the Constitutional dimension
of that policy, expressly recognized in Branzburg v. Hayes, lead us to conclude
that journalists have a federal common law privilege, albeit qualified, to refuse
to divulge their sources.
Riley, 612 F.2d at 715.
69. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1980) (extending a qualified
privilege to journalists not to disclose confidential sources or unpublished information in
criminal cases).
70. Riley, 612 F.2d at 714. The court began by noting that Federal Rule of Evidence
501 does not set forth a specific privilege for reporters, but that it is clear from Congres-
sional statements at the time that such a privilege was considered and not rejected by
Congress. Id.
71. Id. at 716.
72. Id. See also Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 438 (holding that a trial court should consider
four factors: the seeking party's attempts to obtain the information from other sources,
"whether the information goes to the heart of the matter," the information's relevance, and
the type of controversy.).




In applying the privilege, the court looks to a fact-specific analysis
to determine who qualifies for its protection: "[Ilndividuals are
journalists when engaged in investigative reporting, gathering
news, and have the intent at the beginning of the news-gathering
process to disseminate the information to the public."75
In LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Company," the Fourth
Circuit relied on a three-part test developed by the Fifth Circuit in
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc.77 which requires a determina-
tion of whether the information is relevant, whether it can be ob-
tained by alternative means, and whether there is a compelling
interest in it. 7" The Fourth Circuit applied this test in a civil
defamation case and refused to compel disclosure of the confiden-
tial sources of NBC's allegedly defamatory story.79 The court has
declined to punish reporters for refusing to reveal nonconfidential
information, at least where there were other sources of informa-
tion available." In criminal prosecutions, the Fourth Circuit read
Branzburg to demand evidence of bad faith or governmental har-
assment before permitting any privilege in a criminal situation, at
least when the information sought is not confidential.8
The Fifth Circuit split into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in
1981. Prior to that time, it set forth its Miller test, mentioned
above, for civil cases. This test is now used in both circuits.82 The
Fifth Circuit has characterized Branzburg as a "plurality opin-
ion," " and held that it does not protect confidential sources in civil
cases.' Not surprisingly, it later held the same in criminal cases."
75. In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998).
76. 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986).
77. 621 F.2d 721, modified at 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981).
78. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139 (citing Miller, 628 F.2d at 932).
79. Id. The court noted that LaRouche had not exhausted non-party depositions, nor
demonstrated that he had tried unsuccessfully to obtain the information elsewhere. Id. In
addition, the court noted that there were indications that LaRouche knew the names of the
sources before the story was broadcast. Id.
80. United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1976). The court indi-
cated, however, that its decision might be different if the reporters were the only source of
the information. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d at 375.
81. In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992). "[A]bsent... bad faith, the reporters
have no privilege different from that of any other citizen not to testify about knowledge
relevant to a criminal prosecution." Shain, 978 F.2d at 852.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986); In re
Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983).




Although it has not specifically held that there is no privilege for
confidential information in a criminal case, the court has indicated
that it would not look favorably on such a claim.86
The Sixth Circuit has declined to follow the example of other
circuits, and strictly followed Branzburg's admonition to disallow
a reporter's privilege, at least in a grand jury or criminal setting.1
7
Instead, courts in that circuit should
follow the admonition of the majority in Branzburg to
make certain that the proper balance is struck between
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to
give relevant testimony, by determining whether the re-
porter is being harassed in order to disrupt his relation-
ship with confidential news sources, whether the grand
jury's investigation is being conducted in good faith,
whether the information sought bears more than a re-
mote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the inves-
tigation, and whether a legitimate law enforcement need
will be served by forced disclosure of the confidential
source relationship. 8
The Sixth Circuit has not reached the question of a reporter's
privilege in either a civil or criminal case, but has indicated that it
would not look favorably on the claim.89 However, at least one dis-
trict court in that circuit has expressed the view that the weight of
authority requires recognition of a qualified privilege in civil
cases.9 ° Other districts in the circuit have disagreed.91
The Seventh Circuit has only recently spoken on the issue of a
reporter's privilege. McKevitt v. Pallasch92 did not decide the ques-
tion, however, because "there [was] no conceivable interest in con-
85. United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998). "We conclude that news-
reporters enjoy no qualified privilege not to disclose nonconfidential information in criminal
cases." Smith, 135 F.3d at 972.
86. Id. at 971. "Short of... harassment, the media must bear the same burden of
producing evidence of criminal wrongdoing as any other citizen." Id.
87. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1987).
88. Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d at 586.
89. Id. at 585.
90. Southwell v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., 949 F. Supp. 1303, 1312 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (Re-
quiring a party seeking confidential information in a civil case to show that he has ex-
hausted other avenues of gathering it, and that the information goes "to the heart of the
matter," weighed against the harm that disclosure will cause).
91. In re Daimler Chrysler AG Securities Litigation, 216 F.R.D. 395 (E.D. Mich. 2003);
Hade v. City of Fremont, 233 F. Supp. 2d 884 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
92. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
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fidentiality" in that case.93 Language from the court's opinion,
however, indicates that the court would not look favorably on a
claim of privilege.9
In 1972, the Eighth Circuit considered the question of a re-
porter's privilege in the context of a libel case.9" Before the court
reached the question of whether the confidential sources were
privileged from discovery, however, it ruled that the plaintiff had
failed to establish that the defendant-reporter had acted with
knowing or reckless disregard of the truth.9 Such an inquiry, the
court said, had to be made to afford reporters the bare minimum
of First Amendment protection.9 7 Although other courts have in-
terpreted this holding as creating a First Amendment privilege for
reporters, 9 the Eighth Circuit regards the question as "an open
one. "
99
Branzburg, the Ninth Circuit said, reaches beyond the grand
jury context, and requires that, in a criminal case, a judge balance
the "claimed First Amendment privilege" against the "opposing
need for disclosure" under the circumstances." It later adopted
the Second Circuit's test for determining who is eligible for the
privilege."' At the same time, it extended protection to nonconfi-
dential information in a civil libel case.0 2 The first step in apply-
ing this privilege, the Ninth Circuit said, is to determine if the
party seeking the information has made reasonable efforts to ob-
tain it from other sources."' In a later proceeding in the same
case,1" the court set forth its full test for discovery of nonconfiden-
tial information held by a non-party in a civil case: first, the in-
93. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532.
94. Id. at 532-33. "The approaches that these decisions take to the issue of privilege
can certainly be questioned." Id. at 532. "We do not see why there need to be special crite-
ria merely because the possessor of documents or other evidence sought is a journalist.' Id.
at 533.
95. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
96. Cervantes, 464 F.2d at 992.
97. Id. at 993.
98. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (hereinafter "Shoen 1").
99. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997).
100. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976).
101. Shoen 1, 5 F.3d at 1293. "The purpose of the journalist's privilege ... was ... to
protect the activity of 'investigative reporting," regardless of the intended medium. Id.
(citing Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142-44 (2d Cir. 1987)).
102. Shoen 1, 5 F.3d at 1295. The court cautioned, however, that the lack of confidential-
ity may be considered as a factor in the analysis. Id.
103. Id. at 1296. The court indicated that the journalist must first invoke the privilege,
and if he is able to do so, the burden shifts to the other party to overcome it. Id.
104. Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995) (hereinafter "Shoen II).
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formation must be "unavailable despite exhaustion of all reason-
able alternative sources;" second, the information is not cumula-
tive; and third, it must be "clearly relevant to an important is-
sue."
105
In the Tenth Circuit, reporters enjoy a qualified privilege
against discovery in civil cases.0 6 Although the court did not set
out a factor test, it cited favorably to cases such as Baker.7 and
Cervantes,' in which disclosure was denied.' 9 The court later
clarified its position, holding that Silkwood"0 requires a court to
consider the relevance and necessity of the information, the
party's attempts to obtain the information elsewhere, and the na-
ture of the information."' The Tenth Circuit has not decided the
question of a privilege in the criminal context.
After the Fifth Circuit split into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
the Eleventh Circuit continued to follow Miller in civil cases.' In
criminal matters, the court applies the same test, requiring the
party requesting information to demonstrate that the information
is "highly relevant, necessary to the proper presentation of the
case, and unavailable from other sources. " "
The District of Columbia Circuit has granted a qualified privi-
lege to reporters in civil cases."' Branzburg, the court reasoned, is
not controlling in a civil context."5 The court stated that, ordinar-
ily, a civil litigant's interest in the information would yield to the
reporter's privilege."6 However, it cautioned, where the reporter is
a party who would be shielded from liability by the privilege (as in
105. Shoen I1, 48 F.3d at 416.
106. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
107. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
108. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
109. Cervantes, 464 F.2d at 438. The court remarked on various factors, including, inter
alia, the relevance of the information sought, attempts to gain the information elsewhere,
the type of case, and the vagueness of the demand. Id.
110. Silkwood, 563 F.2d 433.
111. Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1466-67 (10th Cir. 1987). The Tenth Circuit
required application of the Silkwood test to a claim that discovery requests from the defen-
dant infringed on the plaintiffs First Amendment Right of Association, rather than his
freedom of press rights. Grandbouche, 825 F.2d at 1467.
112. Price v. Time, 416 F.3d 1327, 1343-48 (11th Cir. 2005).
113. United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987).
114. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Lee v. Dept. of Justice, 413
F.3d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[We . .. held that despite Branzburg there is a reporter's
privilege in civil actions...").
115. Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 711.
116. Id. at 712.
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a libel case), the privilege should be accorded less weight."7 The
court balanced the information's relevance: whether it goes to the
heart of the matter, and whether the litigant has exhausted every
other source in determining whether to compel disclosure of confi-
dential sources.' In a criminal context, the court has affirmed a
district court's determination that requested testimony by report-
ers was not "essential and crucial," and thus that the reporters'
privilege was not overcome. 9
Recently, the D.C. Circuit considered a reporter's claim of privi-
lege in circumstances factually indistinguishable from
Branzburg"2 The reporters in that case made two arguments
relevant to this comment: first, that they were entitled to withhold
their sources under the First Amendment; and second, that they
were entitled to the same protection under the federal common
law."' The circuit court, after a lengthy discussion of Branzburg,
found it to be controlling, and distinguished Zerilli12' as applicable
only to civil cases."' The deciding judges disagreed on the resolu-
tion of the second question.124 While all agreed that any privilege
that might exist was overcome,'25 they expressed divergent views
as to the nature of the privilege and whether it, in fact, existed.'
As the foregoing demonstrates, most circuits recognize a First
Amendment privilege for reporters in civil cases. Many others
recognize such a privilege in criminal cases, while others found
the differences between grand juries and criminal trials to be of no
importance. Branzburg has been effectively limited to the grand
jury setting. The courts have found their support for such a privi-
lege in the First Amendment, despite the invitation of Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 to create a privilege as "reason and experi-
ence" demand.
117. Id. at 714. See also Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 938 (1974) (The reporter's privilege was overcome by the plaintiffs need for the
information when the defendant-reporter was claiming the privilege, and would be shielded
from liability for an allegedly libelous story by enforcing it).
118. Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 713.
119. United States v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
120. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. de-
nied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005) (hereinafter "Miller Subpoena").
121. Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 967.
122. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
123. Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 969-72.
124. Id. at 973.
125. Id.
126. Id. One argued that it should not be decided, one argued in favor of its existence,
and one argued against it. Id.
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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501:
THE CASE FOR A COMMON-LAW PRIVILEGE
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, enacted by Congress in 1974, pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that federal privileges are to be governed
by "the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in light of reason and experi-
ence." 127 The Advisory Committee decided to eliminate specific
proposed privileges, which would have provided for, inter alia, at-
torney-client, psychotherapist-patient, and husband-wife privi-
leges; instead, the committee decided that privileges would be rec-
ognized "based on a confidential relationship and other privileges
should be determined on a case-by-case basis." 8 The rule applies
the Erie doctrine,29 so that in civil actions where state law pro-
vides the rule of decision, state privilege laws apply as well. 3 '
Rule 501 has been used to create, affirm, or deny other privi-
leges over the years.' The Supreme Court follows an analysis
when deciding whether to recognize a privilege that allows it to
consider various factors, including private interest, public interest,
the weight of those interests against evidentiary benefits, and rec-
ognition of the privilege by federal and state governments.
Few courts have applied this analysis to a reporter's privilege.
Judge Tatel, concurring in the D.C. Circuit in Miller Subpoena,
argued that Rule 501 delegated the creation of a reporter's privi-
lege to the courts.' Following the Jaffe framework, he noted the
"chilling effects" that would occur from denial of the privilege, and
the minor evidentiary benefit reaped from it." The public harm,
he said, would be "immense," in light of the large number of confi-
dential source relationships used in journalism.' Judge Tatel
found the lack of empirical support unconvincing, and he noted
127. FED. R. EvID. 501.
128. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note.
129. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
130. FED. R. EVID. 501.
131. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (absolute privilege for conversations
in psychotherapist-patient relationship); University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S.
182 (1990) (denying privilege to academic peer review materials); Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (witness-spouse has a privilege not to testify adversely).
132. Jaffe, 518 U.S. at 10-13.
133. Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 989 (Tatel, J., concurring).




that the Supreme Court has allowed other privileges based on
nothing more than common sense.
Besides, for all the reasons that lead me to conclude that
a privilege exists, reporters and their editors, attorneys,
and sources probably believe the same, making it specu-
lative indeed for the special counsel to suppose that dash-
ing that expectation of confidentiality would have no ef-
fect on newsgathering.
137
Judge Tatel next reviewed treatment of the issue by the states,
noting that there was undisputed evidence before him that "forty-
nine states plus the District of Columbia offer at least qualified
protection to reporters' sources."' He then noted that the clear
weight of federal authority accepted some form of the privilege
and that Department of Justice guidelines 19 protect media sources
from compelled disclosure when it may impair their newsgather-
ing.1O Branzburg, he argued, did not foreclose his conclusion: in
Branzburg the Court specifically noted that Congress had the
power to create a reporter's privilege, and with the enactment of
Rule 501, Congress, in turn, delegated the responsibility for that
determination to the courts.' In addition, "reason and experi-
ence" is different today than it was in 1972, and the question of a
federal common law privilege should be considered accordingly.1
2
At least one other court has applied the same analysis. In New
York Times Co. v. Gonzales,"' the Southern District of New York
concluded, after a discussion of many of the cases above, that
there is a common law reporter's privilege.' It noted the impor-
tant private and public interests served by recognizing a reporter's
privilege."5 Confidential relationships, it said, have led to Water-
gate, investigations into organized crime and nuclear power
136. Id. at 992 (citing Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); Jaffe,
518 U.S. at 10; Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44-45).
137. Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 993 (Tatel, J., concurring).
138. Id.
139. 28 C.F.R. §50.10 (2003).
140. Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 993 (Tatel, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 994.
142. Id.
143. 382 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
144. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 495-96.
145. Id. at 497. The court noted that journalists rely heavily on confidential sources,
which serves their private interests in securing information and effective newsgathering.
Id. It also reasoned that the public interest, served by "full and unhampered reporting," is
best served when reporters are not forced to reveal their sources. Id.
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plants, Iran/Contra, the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and investiga-
tions into financial misconduct of elected officials. " 6 Weighing the
evidentiary benefits resulting from a rejection of the privilege, the
district court found that, although the government received a
benefit in that particular case, confidentiality is essential to many
sources, who will refuse to come forward with their information if
the government can override that promise. "7
Another factor recognized by the district court was the large
number of states whose legislatures have fashioned a reporter's
"shield law.""8 When Branzburg was decided in 1972, Justice
White noted that only a handful of states had enacted such a stat-
ute. 4 9 Now, at least thirty-six states have adopted some form of
reporter's privilege, either judicially or by the legislature.'5 ° The
district court concluded that, based on the weight of authority, the
privilege it recognized was qualified, rather than absolute.'5 '
TODAY
The approach advocated by Judge Tatel in Miller Subpoena and
the Southern District of New York in Gonzales seems to be the
best approach to the question of a reporter's privilege. Beginning
with the Watergate scandal of the 1970's, the press has increas-
ingly relied on confidential sources for much of its information.
Those sources will be less likely to speak if they know their con-
versations or identities may become public knowledge. If these
sources refuse to divulge what they know, the public will suffer
from the lack of knowledge of the information. While there are
some situations in which such disclosure of a source's identity is a
necessity, there are many more situations where it is not needed
at all. A flexible approach, balancing competing needs of journal-
ists and parties to litigation, or the government in criminal cases,
would allow the courts to make a case-by-case determination of
where the greater good lies. The fact that the privilege is quali-
fied, rather than absolute, allows courts to consider many factors,
146. Id. at 498-99.
147. Id. at 500-01.
148. Id. at 502.
149. Branzburg, 418 U.S. at 689.
150. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 502 n.34. See also 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5426, n.96 (1980 & 2005
Supp.).
151. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
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including, as in Miller Subpoena, whether there were any laws
broken when the source gave the reporter his information.
In Branzburg, Justice White expressed concern over the difficul-
ties in administering a judicially-created privilege for reporters.
However, the federal courts since then have proved his worry un-
founded, easily determining who may claim the privilege by creat-
ing tests that are more flexible and workable than those created
by the legislature. A statutory test is bound by the words used in
the statute and often leaves out important categories of people,
through deliberate omission or unworkable definitions. When
courts are left to develop their own definitions of "reporter," they
have the opportunity to consider more than a statutory list of peo-
ple who are protected. This allows them to administer the privi-
lege fairly, regardless of whether the person is a reporter, editor,
journalist, blogger, anchor, or photographer.
Another important consideration is Federal Rule of Evidence
1101, which provides that Rule 501 is the only evidentiary rule
applicable in grand juries. Because Branzburg only decided that
there was no First Amendment privilege for reporters, there is
still the possibility that the Supreme Court will someday decide
that Rule 501 includes a reporter's privilege based on the confi-
dential relationship rather than the Constitution. This privilege
would then be applicable to grand juries through Rule 1101.
CONCLUSION
Over the last thirty years, courts have spent considerable time
and energy distinguishing Branzburg. It seems a moot point now
to argue that there is no reporter's privilege in the federal courts.
Federal courts since Branzburg have carefully kept to its original
holding in the grand jury setting, but they have taken the reins
when the question of a privilege is raised in other contexts. The
addition of Rule 501 tips the balance. The Supreme Court decided
that there was no First Amendment privilege in grand juries, leav-
ing a number of open questions for the lower courts to answer. In
both civil and criminal contexts, the reporter's privilege is well
established, perhaps not to the extent that the press would like,
but to an extent that fairly balances the interests of the govern-
ment, the people, and the press.
Kristina Spinneweber
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